The Role of South-South Cooperation in present Brazilian Foreign Policy: Actors, Interests and Functions

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Abstract: During recent years the emergence of regional, emerging or rising powers has achieved more attention due to their growing influence in the international power constellation. As examples of this phenomenon Brazil, India and South Africa can be named, which are actively expanding their bi- and multilateral cooperation within the global South. Based on the assumption that South-South Cooperation represents a foreign policy instrument of increasing importance for the emerging powers, our aim is to ask what its specific functions are. We start by discussing the concept of South-South Cooperation from the theoretical perspectives of Dependency as well as Neoclassical Realism on international relations. We then approach this concept by analyzing Brazil as a case study, as the described developments can be clearly seen since the present government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva came to power in 2003. In this case we focus on the main actors in the domestic arena and how their interests are translated to foreign policies within the region and the global South in general.

Keywords: Brazil, Foreign Policy, South-South Cooperation, Dependency Theory, Neoclassical Realism, Lula da Silva

1. Introduction

During recent years a growing discussion has emerged around the dynamics caused by so called regional, emerging or rising powers that have sought to assume new positions within their respective regional contexts as well as within the international system in general, looking for new partners for cooperation and forming alliances within the global South (Hurrel, 2006; Nayyar, 2008; Schmitz and Messner, 2008; Husar and Maihold and Mair, 2009). These new forms of South-South Cooperation have led some authors to believe that we face a “new power from the South” (Alden and Vieira, 2005; Dieter, 2003). The countries usually considered as examples for this phenomenon are Brazil, India and South Africa, which have joined in the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum for Trilateral Cooperation (IBSA). Also China and Russia are often named, which together with the latter form the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa group (BRICS). Other forms of cooperation can be mentioned, for example the G20 in the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the G77.

This paper focuses on Brazil since it can undoubtedly be considered a regional power and has shown the desire to assume a more active role as an international player (Lima and Hirst, 2006;
Schirm, 2007). Especially under the present presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-today), Brazilian foreign policy has put an emphasis on South-South Cooperation. This paper argues that the intensification of Brazil’s cooperative behavior in the South-South context is not merely motivated by South-South solidarity as the concept of South-South Cooperation might suggest, but is also guided by power interests and therefore used as an instrument on several levels to improve and consolidate its international position as an emerging player. In this sense our aim is to explore what Brazil’s specific political, strategic, economic or even social interests and intentions concerning South-South Cooperation are and how the instrument is implemented on the different levels of foreign policy. As a first step, we will introduce the concept of South-South Cooperation and then - in order to identify its conceptual shortcomings in our particular case - contrast it with the assumptions of Neoclassical Realism. In the second step we will concentrate on Brazil’s foreign policy system, analyzing the most important actors pushing for an expansion of South-South Cooperation. Thirdly, we look at how Brazil implements South-South Cooperation on a regional level and with other countries from the “Global South”.

2. Theoretical Concepts

2.1. South-South Cooperation

Following the thoughts of Dependency Theorists such as Cardoso and Falleto (2004) and Senghaas (1979) the concept of South-South Cooperation is understood as a mechanism through which countries of the global South would be enabled to overcome dependence from the industrialized nations of the global North (the so called core in the World System theory of Wallerstein 1980) by strengthening the political, technical and economic cooperation among each other. In a practical sense it can be distinguished between economic and technical-academic cooperation among developing countries (ECDC and TCDC respectively). While the first refers to the exchange of primary, semi-manufactured and manufactured goods between developing nations, the latter pursues the exchange of technical knowledge as stated in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action of the year 1978. As Carlsson (1982: 45ff.) points out, this horizontal interaction should allow the developing nations to overcome the trap of underdevelopment by (1) extending their markets and giving the countries of the South a possibility to exploit economies of scale and specialization through trade, (2) by isolating the South from fluctuations in the economies of the core, and (3) by reducing economic and political dependence and thereby increasing the bargaining power of the periphery versus the core (the former colonial or neo-colonial powers).

The problem with South-South Cooperation as a concept for academic research, on the one hand, is its imprecision, so that any kind of relations among countries of the South can be named as such. Furthermore the concept itself is not being used consistently as it has been evolving substantively in the last decades. For instance, countries such as China, India and Brazil, which
are transforming from recipients of Development Aid to so called “New Donors”, “Emerging Donors” or “Non-DAC Donors”, label their foreign assistance as South-South Cooperation (Kragelund, 2008; Schläger, 2007). Therefore, many people in academia and politics are involved in efforts to find a proper definition for South-South Cooperation (ECOSOC, 2008; Agrawal, 2007; Costa Vaz, 2007; Sidiropoulos, 2007; etc.)¹.

On the other hand, the concept of South-South Cooperation - presuming a horizontal and equal interaction - neglects the existence of economic and power asymmetries as well as the possibilities of dependencies between the countries of the South themselves. As Carlsson (1982) points out: " […] the most serious problem is not connected with the actual establishment of intra-South trade, but it's general effects on the development prospects of its participants; […] In the case of South-South trade it is likely that a replication of the exploitative North-South trade relationship will occur and the weaker economies of the South will continue to lag behind”.

As it is our task to understand the functions of South-South Cooperation within Brazilian foreign policy - and bearing in mind the mentioned problems related to this concept - we will introduce the theoretical approach of Neoclassical Realism. We choose this approach because it links foreign policy behavior with power and economic interests, two dimensions that in our eyes cannot be dismissed when analyzing Brazilian international cooperation.

2.2. Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical Realism belongs to the Realist school of International Relations, but, differing from Neorealism, it is mainly focused on foreign policy rather than on systemic constellations (Rose 1988). Neoclassical Realism, according to Rose (1988), Schweller (1997) and Grieco et al. (1993), adopts the main assumptions of Classical Realism, which was originally developed in the context of the cold war. According to Classical Realism and its most famous authors as Morgenthau (1948 and 2006) and Carr (1946), states are the main actors in the international world order, which in turn is primarily characterized by the absence of a supranational authority and is therefore anarchic. Within this system, states act rationally and are power and cost oriented in order to ensure their own survival as well as their absolute and relative gains in terms of security and welfare.

Neoclassical Realism builds on these assumptions, but tries to widen its analytical framework by focusing on a number of intervening or process variables. For instance, the perception of states as monolithic “black boxes”, whose foreign policy is determined by systemic necessities is not

¹ Good examples for this searching process are specially the Report of the ECOSOC on South-South and Triangular Cooperation (2008) or the many conferences on the subject, as the one held at the University of Mumbai/India titled “Redefining South-South Cooperation. Africa on the centre stage” (23-25 February 2009).
given up, but this thought is softened (Gilpin 1996: 7-8). It can be seen that the political strategies of inner state elites and even the personality of political leaders are taken into account as analytical categories and therefore intervening variables, especially when analyzing short-term state behavior: these elites or leaders may pursue strategies that are aimed at immediate benefits rather than at long-term security (Rose, 1988: 147; Barkin, 2009: 242). These modifications of Realism’s assumptions allow Neoclassical Realists to see cooperative forms of behavior to be much more probable (for instance when compared to Neorealist perspectives): international institutions are ascribed certain relevance as a form of cooperation because they are perceived as fora for state interaction, where power relations are being shaped. In this sense, cooperative behavior - and this includes South-South Cooperation - “provides [...] actors with gains and rewards” (Milner 1992: 468). It can be interpreted as a possibly less costly option to maintain or even improve one’s relative position in relation to others in terms of power, especially for states with relatively scarce military resources (Pedersen, 2002; Burges, 2008).

We believe that when analyzing Brazil’s foreign policy by contrasting the concept of South-South Cooperation in the light of the two approaches of Dependency Theory and Neoclassical Realism, we will be able to better understand how far Brazil’s behavior can be classified as horizontal cooperation that aims at mutual benefits or is primarily motivated by unilateral power and economic calculations in order to improve the countries international position.

3. Brazilian Foreign Policy
Since President Lula came to power in 2003, South-South Cooperation has become increasingly important in Brazil’s foreign policy. We find that this instrument is implemented on various foreign policy levels, following a variety of interests. We will therefore first look at the most important actors that shape Brazilian South-South Cooperation. Then we will analyze how these are being translated to foreign policies regarding the regional and the extra-regional level, by this trying to show that there are differences and at the same time connections between these levels.

3.1. Actors and Interests shaping South-South Cooperation
The new vogue of South-South Cooperation during the last ten to fifteen years can be traced back to at least five groups of actors on a domestic level that pursue specific interests. These are (1) the Presidency, (2) the Ministry of Foreign Relations and (3) other bodies of the bureaucracy. Furthermore there are non-governmental actors such as (4) companies as well as (5) NGOs and social movements.

3.1.1. The Presidency
The expansion of South-South Cooperation has to be seen as one element of a broader change
in foreign (economic) policy, which has been mainly introduced by the subsequent Presidencies since the 1990s. The main characteristic of this foreign policy is the decline of the isolationist position Brazil had while - one the one side - being ruled by the Armed Forces (1964-1985) and while - on the other - being focused on the paradigm of Industrialization via Import Substitution (ISI). With the end of the military government and the crisis of the ISI development model, President Collor (1990-1992) opted for a liberalization of the state-dominated economy, combined with a gradual integration of the country in the region and into the world market. This approach was further deepened during the presidencies of Franco (1992-1994), Cardoso (1995-2002) and finally Lula (2003-today), although there are important differences between them.

Following Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) the post-1990 foreign policy is shaped by two main foreign policy paradigms, which see South-South Cooperation from a different perspective. Following the paradigm of “foreign autonomy through integration”, Collor and Cardoso focused mainly on the traditional partners in the North (the US and the European Union), while Lula, on the contrary, by following the paradigm of “foreign autonomy through diversification”, sought to maintain the relations with the traditional partners of the North, and at the same time tightening cooperation with the global South. Looking at the specific case of South-South Cooperation as part of those paradigms, Saraiva (2007), based on the assumptions of Lima (2005), distinguishes between the traditional and the new South-South Cooperation. While the first mainly concentrated on expanding South-South Cooperation on economic issues on the regional level (as the creation of Common Market of the South - Mercosul - in 1991 shows), the new South-South Cooperation is much broader, focusing on deepening economic, political, technical and cultural ties on a bi- and multilateral basis with developing nations in and outside the region. As will be shown below, the latter can again be grouped by (a) system affecting states as India, China, South Africa etc. and (b) developing nations in general, mainly located in Latin America and Africa (as Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique etc.). During the administration of President Lula, this new South-South Cooperation has been strengthened, as it can be seen in the case of the IBSA Dialogue Forum as well as Brazilian policy towards the African continent (de la Fontaine and Seifert, 2009).

One might believe, that with pursuing this approach Lula is re-vitalizing the third-world position of the former Presidents Quadros (1961) and Goulart (1961-1964), which under the maxim of the “independent foreign policy” opted for a confrontationist position facing the USA while cooperating with the Soviet Union, China and other countries of the South that were undergoing revolutionary processes, such as Cuba. However, as Lima (2007) points out, there is more resemblance with the foreign policy approach of President General Geisel (1974-1979), who in the context of the world energy crisis followed the dictum of “responsible pragmatism”, by this - on the one hand - trying to play a leading role in the Latin American region, and at the same time looking for new
economic partners in Africa and Asia, which could supply oil and serve as external markets for the growing Brazilian industry. But, on the other hand, also the cooperation with the USA should be further strengthened (Pecequilo, 2008; Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007: 13). In this sense “responsible pragmatism” of the 1970s shows most similarities with the way Lula approaches South-South Cooperation, because he - as mentioned above - is not aiming to obstruct the existing cooperation with the USA or the EU. Much more, he has the economic and political aim to expand Brazilian influence in the region and in the global South in general.

3.1.2. The Ministry of Foreign Relations
The most important bureaucratic actor shaping Brazilian South-South Cooperation is the Ministry of Foreign Relations, commonly known as Itamaraty. As Saraiva (2008) explains, there are two strong programmatic and ideological currents within Itamaraty, namely the autonomists and the liberals. The group of the autonomists has a globalist world view and is sensitive to the North-South divide. They pursue national development, regional stability as well as an autonomous positioning in the international arena through a neo-structuralist approach, meaning (a) a careful and gradual opening to the world market through regional integration, starting with the Mercosur, (b) a stronger, but benevolent regional leadership and (c) participation in international institutions and a South-South Cooperation with the aim to lower the economic and political dependence from the industrialized nations (mainly the USA and the EU). The liberals, in contrast, would rather prefer Brazil to be part of the group of industrialized countries and great powers, and hence support a closer economic and political cooperation with the USA, the EU and other emerging economies. Cooperation with other countries of the South in their eyes should be strengthened if it supports the expansion of Brazilian economic and political strength. Although Brazilian regional leadership should be rather discrete, the liberals claim for more engagement in international institutional arrangements on the global level. As Saraiva (2007) suggests, the liberals gained and the autonomists lost strength during the Cardoso administration (1995-2002). Nonetheless, during the presidency of Lula the autonomists are the main actors shaping foreign policy within the Itamaraty, pushing for more South-South Cooperation. The most important figures are Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, as well as Secretary-General of Itamaraty Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, defend the expansion of South-South Cooperation on an ideological and a programmatic level (Gratius, 2004: 10; Pecequilo, 2008).

3.1.3. Other bodies of the bureaucracy
Literature on Brazilian foreign policy usually ascribes little importance to other bodies of the Brazilian bureaucracy - besides the Itamaraty – when it comes to analyze the actors shaping South-South Cooperation. Nevertheless, a look at each specific public policy area presents evidence of the contrary. To illustrate one example: As Costa Vaz (2007) points out, Brazil is
playing a growing role as a provider of technical assistance to other developing nations in many sectors such as agriculture, social development, health care, industry, science and technology. Main drivers behind this development are the Brazilian Agency for Development Cooperation (ABC, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, subordinated to Itamaraty), on the one hand, and the sector-specific ministries and agencies on the other. While the ABC is responsible for arranging the cooperation agreements with the partner countries and at the same time coordinating all efforts of technical South-South Cooperation undertaken by all bureaucratic entities, each single ministry pursues an own international cooperation agenda. Moreover, agencies such as EMBRAPA (agriculture) or FIOCRUZ (health care), which are in charge of the practical implementation of cooperation-agreements, also develop specific preferences and interests.

3.1.4. Brazilian Companies
Since the 1990s Brazilian companies have been rapidly internationalizing, with the Latin American region and the South in general gradually gaining more importance. This led Flynn (2007) to the conclusion that Brazil has gained a sub-imperialist position. In this sense, it is important to take a look at the special role that business plays in the expansion of Brazilian foreign trade relations, in general, and within the global South, in particular. Oliveira and Pfeifer (2008: 391ff.) describe that in the 1990s - in the context of democratization, economic liberalization and privatization - an opening of the foreign policy system started, giving private actors like corporations and business chambers a better access to the decision making process, being Brazilian Business Coalition CEB the most important national representative of business interests in foreign policy. In the context of the Brazilian accession to the WTO in the year 1995 and the ascension of Cardoso to the office of Foreign Minister (and later Finance Minister), first communication and cooperation mechanisms were established between (private and public) corporations and the Government.

One of the main interests of Brazilian corporations related to foreign policy is to be supported by the government in the process of their internationalization. Official assistance to public as well as to private corporations has effectively been rising since the 1990s, with a strong dynamic since the Technology and Foreign Trade Policy introduced by President Lula in 2003. As the case of Brazilian trade with Africa shows, Brazilian companies have a strong influence on shaping Brazilian economic South-South Cooperation. Oliveira Ribeiro’s (2007: 204) interviews with

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2 The most important institutions to be mentioned are the (a) Standing Economic Committee (Comitê Comercial Permanente, 1992), (b) the Standing Business Council of the Foreign Ministry (Conselho Empresarial Permanente do MRE), (c) the Consultative Forum for Questions of Foreign Trade (Grupo Executivo do Comercio Exterior) which is part of the inter-ministerial Chamber of Foreign Trade CAMEX and (d) the Council for Economic and Social Development (Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social - CDES), created by Lula in 2003 (Doctor 2007).

3 Logistical support was mainly provided by the Ministry of Foreign Relations in their role as central coordinator of foreign policy, especially the Department for Commercial Promotion (Departamento de Promoção Comercial), while financial assistance came from the National Development Bank BNDES and Banco do Brasil (Aykut and Goldstein 2007: 97; Oliveira and Pfeifer 2008: 405).
representatives of the biggest Brazilian corporations abroad such as Petrobras, Vale do Rio Doce and Camargo Correia, show that the Foreign Ministry and its embassies are seen as important partners that have helped to build first contacts, get to know the local markets and eventually access specific sectors in Africa. This is the reason why, in their eyes, the Itamaraty has gone through a transformation from a strict diplomatic institution to an agency with a stronger focus on foreign trade.

3.1.5. NGOs and social movements

During the administrations of Cardoso and Lula the impact of NGOs and social movements on the foreign policy agenda has also been growing (Oliveira, 1999: 127ff.). This is mainly due to the fact that in the last two decades these actors have been gaining importance on the national as well as on the international political arena, building networks and accumulating bargaining power (Cason and Power, 2009: 128). Two examples for the formation of such networks and their impact on the official foreign policy in Brazil are the World Social Forum, first held in Porto Alegre in 2001, as well as the Landless Peasant Movement MST, the biggest social movement in Latin America. In the first case it could already be witnessed that President Lula in his first year in office (2003) did give almost the same attention to the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre as to the World Economic Forum in Davos, pointing out the social problems linked to globalization and calling for more action against hunger and poverty (MRE, 2007b: 17).

In the second case, the MST was one of the strongest pressure groups, which led Lula to create the General Coordination for International Actions of Combat against Hunger (CGFOME) within Itamaraty in 2004 as the main coordinating institution for humanitarian assistance. The CGFOME has proved to be an open platform for civil society actors such as the MST, which has been hired to deliver equipment, food, seeds and skills for small scale farming to a variety of countries in the global South. Furthermore NGOs are playing a bigger role when it comes to the provision of specific information, skills and services in the context of technical South-South Cooperation. For instance, NGOs such as Pastoral da Criança, Missão Criança, Alfabetização Solidária and Viva Rio are engaged in the implementation of social projects in Latin America and Africa, usually coordinated by the Brazilian Agency for Development Cooperation ABC (Vieira, 2004: 62ff.).

3.2. South-South Cooperation on a regional level

Having presented the decisive actors in Brazilian South-South Cooperation, we now examine the country’s actual performance within Latin America. Since the end of military government and the

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beginning of re-democratization, Brazil has occupied an important role and sees itself as a “natural leader” in the region (Lima, 2005: 27; Saraiva, 2008; Souza, 2008). According to Zilla (2009: 51ff.), this is primarily based on the country’s superiority in terms of “hard power”, meaning economic welfare and resources (Schirm, 2007: 4)⁶ and “soft power”, understood as sharing international values and engaging in international and regional multilateral initiatives.

Brazil’s aspiration to regional leadership is met with some reluctance by other countries like Argentina, Venezuela and smaller countries such as Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Ecuador. Under Lula’s presidency, the aspiration to play an active leading role within South America has gained new momentum and South-South Cooperation appears to be one instrument to achieve this goal. Traditionally, Brazil’s foreign policy in the region was implemented according to the paradigm of “non-interventionism”, but Lula’s approach is clearly more intervening (Saraiva, 2007: 47-48).

On the regional level of South-South Cooperation it is important to differentiate between a multilateral and bilateral level: On a multi-lateral level, Brazil is engaging in several regional integration projects since the 1990s. By doing this, Burges (2007) argues, that the country is pursuing a strategy of diversifying its South-South linkages and especially its trade relations in the region. From his perspective, Brazil is following a neo-structuralist approach with the aim of gradually integrating into the world market through regionalization. This form of foreign trade policy aims at “creating beneficial conditions for domestic actors that might also be attractive to key constituencies in partner countries” (Burges, 2007: 1348-1349). Though already started under the governments of Collor de Mello and F.H. Cardoso, this development has gained new momentum since Lula. The most important integration project is the Mercosul, which was originally founded in 1991 by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Currently Mercosul is expanding⁷, but is often criticized for lagging behind its integration goals (Saraiva, 2007: 48-50).

Since Mexico joined NAFTA⁸ together with the USA and Canada in 1994, Brazil has focused on bringing forth alternative political integration projects for the South American region, in which it could assume a leading position. Therefore, Brazil opposed the US-driven FTAA-project⁹, which would have left the country in an inferior position vis-à-vis the USA. The integration projects initiated by Brazil, which so far have not developed a high degree of institutionalization, are the

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⁶ Military dominance is of course also important, but due to the region’s relative peacefulness (at least in terms of interstate-violence), the other two categories are of greater importance.

⁷ Nowadays, Chile, Peru and Bolivia are associated members and even Venezuela – after having some disputes with the Brazilian Congress, which opposes it becoming a member of the Mercosul – has strengthened its relations with the Mercosul, although it continues to pursue its own regional integration project ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas) (Burges, 2007).

⁸ North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement.

⁹ Free Trade Area of the Americas.
UNASUL\textsuperscript{10} and the IIRSA\textsuperscript{11}. Brazil also joined the Bank of the South, originally started by Venezuela\textsuperscript{12}. Although Brazil is strong in initiating regional projects, it cannot be ignored that it has had difficulties acting according to its own postulates – claiming to be a positive leader and worrying about being perceived as a malevolent hegemon on the one hand, but being extremely reluctant to give up sovereignty and backing the costs for the integration projects due to inner state resistances on the other (Burges, 2007: 1350; Camargo, 2005; Zilla, 2009: 62). The creation of Bank of the South and the Structural Fund of the Mercosul (FOCEM)\textsuperscript{13} during the Lula-Administration can be interpreted as an attempt to show good will to deal with the huge economic and political disparities between Brazil and its smaller neighbors.

On the contrary, on a bilateral level Brazil has shown several times that it is willing to assume more costs in order to maintain allies and a positive image. This became obvious in 2006 when Bolivia’s President Evo Morales nationalized property of Brazil’s partly state owned oil company Petrobras and demanded a higher price for its gas on which Brazil is highly dependent. Lula quickly accepted these demands not only because of this dependency, but also in order to avoid an escalation of the conflict which would have pushed Morales even closer to Hugo Chávez and his integration project ALBA. Nevertheless, Lula’s decision was highly controversial in Brazil and even opposed by the Petrobras Management (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007: 302). Another example is Brazil’s leading role in the UN Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, where the country is able to present itself as a mediator between the region’s conflict parties and a multilateral institution such as the UN (Seitenfus, 2007). Brazil also categorizes its technical assistance as bilateral South-South cooperation. Here, the ABC (vid. 3.1.3.) is dedicating approximately one third of its budget to projects within the region (mostly to Paraguay) and also other actors (like EMBRAPA or FIOCRUZ) are executing projects, focusing mainly on the issues agriculture, health, (professional) education, social development and technology (Costa Vaz, 2008; MRE, 2007: 11ff.).

Brazil’s ambiguous behavior to only reluctantly assume the costs that come with integration processes on a multilateral level but more willingly on a bilateral level can be explained by taking into account two factors. On the one hand the increasing importance of the Presidency in the decision-making process of external affairs and Lula’s personal interest in foreign policy as well as in South-South Cooperation (vid. 3.1.2.) have to be considered. On the other hand the different currents in the Brazilian diplomacy, especially within Itamaraty (vid. 3.1.1.) are also

\textsuperscript{10} Union of South American Nations, formerly CASA/CSN (Community of South American Nations).
\textsuperscript{11} Initiative for the Integration of the South American Regional Infrastructure.
\textsuperscript{12} Also other countries are equally pursuing other regional integration projects such as ALBA mentioned above or the CAN by the Andean countries.
\textsuperscript{13} See http://www.mercosur.int/focem, rev. 30/08/10. The Fund has a budget of approximately USD 100 Mio., 70% of which are provided by Brazilian state institutions and private banks (http://funcapciencia.funcap.ce.gov.br/synopsis/synopsis-12-12-2008/brazils-proposal-of-mercosur-fund-for-business-ready-for-launching, rev. 30/08/10).
important. As Lima and Hirst (2006: 37) put it: “[…] domestic support has not been easily gained by Itamaraty, and public opinion at home has been more vigilant than ever as to the pros and cons of Lula’s activist diplomacy. […] Brazil’s foreign affairs have now become a matter of controversy in domestic politics in a way that they were not in the past, and intra-bureaucratic divergences over the priorities of the country’s foreign policy have also become more frequent.”

As a result we can interpret the Brazilian hesitant, but still ongoing, engagement in multilateral activities as well as the growing attention that is given to technical cooperation projects in the region as an attempt to strengthen the bonds between Brazil and the other countries. Also, the diffusion of ideas concerning political and economic integration is becoming stronger in Brazilian Foreign Policy due to the growing influence of the autonomist current under Lula. Because of the large asymmetries between Brazil and the other countries in South America, it is difficult to classify this cooperation only as horizontal. Instead, it seems that Lula and his administration see it as a form of expanding and consolidating Brazil’s dominant position – not in an aggressive, but in a cooperative way that allows it to rather convince than to force others to accept Brazil in its hegemonic role as Burges (2008: 81) and Pedersen (2002: 685) suggest, thusly avoiding the payoffs that come with a coercive leadership. As Burges (2009: 46ff.) points out, this strategy is coherent with leadership ambitions already being pursued under Lulas predecessor Cardoso, whose diplomats denied the Brazilian desire for any form of leadership exercised by military or any other direct form of power, but were ready to point out Brazil’s important role in the regional integration. Lula’s administration more openly shows the desire to assume a leading position, but nonetheless clearly wishes to involve rather than to control the other countries and tries to convince them that Brazil playing an upfront part in the regional integration also holds benefits for the whole region (Burges, 2008: 76).

We will now examine Brazil’s South-South Cooperation with other countries of the global South outside the region in order to be able to analyze the differences and interdependence between the country’s behavior in the region and on an international scale.

3.3. Extra-regional South-South Cooperation: A two level game

Following Lima (2005) and Saraiva (2008) one can observe that since 1993 there have been new dynamics related to the cooperation with other countries of the global South beyond the Latin American region. Here one needs to differentiate between the cooperation with other system affecting states (a concept used by Lima based on Keohane, 1969), on the one hand, and developing nations in general on the other. System affecting states are - according to Lima (2005) - those countries that due to relative limited resources and capacities compared to the global powers are looking to form collective actions on a multilateral level with like-minded states in
order to have some kind of influence on the international arena. In international fora these countries usually act as brokers, mediating between small and powerful nations.

The cooperation with other system affecting states is part of the strategy of “foreign autonomy through diversification” (vid. 3.1.1.), which has been strengthened under the administration of Lula (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007: 324). In this regard we can again differentiate between bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks. In the case of bilateral cooperation there is an emphasis on expanding trade relations with China, India, South Africa, Russia, Nigeria and the oil exporting nations of the Middle East (Almeida, 2007a+b and 2009; Lima and Hirst, 2006). China is by far the most important Brazilian partner of the South, bearing in mind that in a very short period of time it has become one of the three top ranking Brazilian foreign trade partners together with the European Union and the USA. China is a destination of 10.7 billion USD (2007) of Brazilian exports (mainly products of the primary sector as iron and related resources, soy beans and soy oil as well as steal related products) and Brazil imports products worth 12.6 billion USD (2007). Compared to the total of Brazilian foreign trade of about 281,3 billion USD (2007), Chinas share is about 8 percent, being Brazil the biggest trading-partner of China in Latin America (Becard, 2009). Trade relations with other countries such as India, South Africa and Russia have developed less rapidly due to missing complementarities. These countries usually produce and export similar products of the primary, secondary and even tertiary sector. Also the regional trade frameworks like the Mercosul in the case of Brazil, the SACU (South African Customs Union) as well as the SADC (South African Development Community) in the case of South Africa, the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), the SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area) in the case of India, constrain Brazil in expanding trade relations unilaterally (Hirst, 2008; Ribeiro, 2007).

In the case of the multilateral cooperation frameworks, the most important examples are (1) the trilateral cooperation framework with India and South Africa in the IBSA Dialogue Forum / G3 and (2) the G22 together with China, Argentina among others. In the first case it can be stated that for Brazil IBSA is essentially a strategic matter with the aim to have a stronger voice in different issues vis-à-vis the industrialized nations, especially the USA. This was the case in 2003 when the three countries initiated the IBSA Dialogue Forum as an alliance (demanding the end of agricultural subsidies and the access to the markets of the Industrialized Nations for producers of the South in the context of the WTO in Cancún) and it continued having this ad-hoc-alliance character in other several cases such as the dispute over the pharmaceutical patents for anti-retroviral HIV medication (Herz, 2008 160). It cannot be denied that there has been a strong growth in the cooperation among the countries in trade, but compared to the total foreign trade

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14 http://economia.uol.com.br/ultnot/fusa/2008/01/14/ult3679u3018.jhtm, rev. 30/08/10. Since the world financial crisis Brazil is witnessing a trade surplus with China.
figures of each country, trade volume among each other is relatively low, ranging between 0.8 percent and 2 percent (Chevallier et al, 2008; de la Fontaine, 2007). The G22 essentially followed the principle of IBSA (being mainly coordinated by India, Brazil and South Africa) as an strategic alliance for the international arena, showing a very big variety of interests, what finally makes it very hard for it to act unanimously further than for single case issues (Schmalz, 2008: 146 ff).

Interestingly Brazilian foreign policy also sought to expand South-South Cooperation with other developing nations beyond the regional context, which are not system affecting per se. Here we focus on two developments: (1) Brazil is expanding its bilateral political, economic and technical cooperation with countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and (2) Brazil is multilaterally engaging with the African continent, initiating the creation of an interregional institutional framework between South America and Africa.

Ad 1: Bilateral cooperation with countries in Africa and other regions
When considering Brazil’s cooperation with non-system-affecting states on a bilateral basis, we can see that it takes place on a (a) political, (b) economic and (c) technical level. It can be said that Brazil mostly focuses on Latin America (vid. 3.2.) and Africa, but cooperation with developing countries in Asia can also be identified (As East Timor for instance). Brazil’s main partners outside the region are those it has a cultural relationship with and those that represent some strategic value on one of the three levels mentioned above. With Angola, São Tome e Principe, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, Brazil has founded the Community of Portuguese speaking countries CPLP in 1998 (MRE, 2002). Nigeria and again Angola also receive special attention due to their statues as important petroleum countries (Seibert, 2009).

On a political level (a), we can see that Lula has strengthened Brazil’s institutional presence, mainly in Africa. Here, since 2003 he did not only re-open embassies, which had been closed during the Cardoso administration, but he also created new ones (in total there are 16 new Brazilian diplomatic representations in Africa). This approach was responded by the African nations with several high level visits to Brazil and the inauguration of new embassies in Brasilia, increasing the amount of diplomatic representations from 16 to more than 25 since 2003 (Oliveira Ribeiro, 2007: 172).

Much more prestigious and attention-attracting than these institutional changes are the numerous diplomatic visits to developing countries, which showed more interest for countries from the South when compared to the Cardoso administration (Seitenfus, 2007), and within the South, in turn, again a focus on Africa. Lula himself has traveled to the continent more than nine times (at least once a year) visiting more than 20 countries since 2003, always leading high-level delegations
with representatives from Brazil’s diplomatic and economic community. Also, his foreign minister Celso Amorim visited the continent several times. This “travel diplomacy” has to be seen against the background that Lula has clearly changed Brazilian policy towards Africa, showing that he personally not only felt a strong commitment for black empowerment inside\textsuperscript{15} of the Brazilian society but also for issues of social, political and economic development in Africa. He therefore developed the so called “cultural diplomacy” towards the continent, what in his words can be understood as a policy of compensation for the years of slavery in a country that - with more than 80 million Afro-Brazilians - has one of the biggest afro-descendent communities outside of Africa (Lechini, 2005, 2006). Jaguaribe even goes so far to say that the focus on Africa came since Brazil started „[...] considering itself as an African country [...]. [...] According to the latest census figures, the country’s population has increased tenfold in the last century to 175 million – with about 122.5 million of African heritage“ (Manke, 2008).

On an economic level (b), Brazilian Foreign Policy increasingly functions as a facilitator between foreign countries and Brazilian enterprises (vid. 3.1.4.). Again, this can be witnessed in Africa. For instance, representatives of Brazilian business associations participate in the diplomatic delegations to the region. According to Ribeiro (2007) there is a growing number of Brazilian enterprises in Africa, being Petrobras, Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa and CVRD the most important ones. Petrobras – active in Africa since 1959 – has gone through a strong process of internationalization since 1999, investing gradually in the African Oil and Gas extraction in Angola, Nigeria (the biggest supplier of oil to Brazil), Equatorial Guinea and Tanzania (Araújo Figueroa, 2007: 217 ff.). Camargo Corrêa is only present in Africa since 2005, after having participated at a official delegation with President Lula to Angola in the year 2003. Today - besides Angola - they have projects in the sector of infrastructure in Mozambique and in South Africa. Odebrecht has already more experience working in Africa since 1982 when it started being involved in the Soviet-Brazilian project the hydroelectric power plant of Capanda in Angola. Several other projects of infrastructure followed, as in Mauretania, Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville und Cameroon. Still today the Brazilian Government funds the finalization of the Capanda project, which has been interrupted during the years of the Angolan civil war. Finally CVRD is mainly present in South Africa, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique and Democratic Republic of Congo, countries in which it already has excavation rights or is searching for copper, iron ore, nickel, coal etc.

On the level of technical cooperation (c), it can be seen that Brazil is currently going through a transformation from being a net receiver of development assistance to an “emerging donor” with an own framework for technical cooperation with other developing nations, mainly in Latin

\textsuperscript{15} During the Lula administration the Affirmative Action Program of the Foreign Ministry was further extended with the aim to have more than 50 afro-descendent students annually in the program from 2005 on: See UNDP, 2004, http://www.pnud.org.br/raca/reportagens/index.php?id01=389&lay=raci#, rev. 30/08/10.
America and Africa (Ayllón Pino and Costa Leite, 2010; Kragelund, 2008). The Brazilian Agency for Development Cooperation (ABC) is the main administrative body coordinating technical cooperation, but many other ministries and agencies are included or even developing their own cooperation programs (Costa Vaz, 2007, 2008; Schläger, 2007). According to the ECOSOC (2008), Brazil spends around 356 Million USD per year for technical cooperation, which is concentrated on the areas of social development and education, health, infrastructure, agriculture and Industry. Officially, Brazil only starts technical cooperation when being asked by other countries. Additionally the cooperation has, officially, no conditionalities, thus trying to respect the principle of non-interference. About half of the technical assistance is invested in Latin America the other half mainly goes to Africa and Asia (ABC, 2008). In Africa, the countries with the highest number of projects in 2006/2007 were Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Sao Tome e Principe and Guinea Bissau (Valler Filho, 2007: 245). Outside Africa, the most important partner countries are Lebanon, Papua Guinea and East Timor, the latter receiving the lion share of all three (MRE, 2007: 81ff).

Ad 2: Multilateral engagement with the African continent
The approach towards multilateral frameworks with the African continent was based on initiatives from the Cardoso administration, mainly concentrating on the SACU and SADC as well as on the CPLP. In the first case the negotiations focused on the possibilities of creating a common free trade area, a plan that is still on hold due to the complexity such an interregional framework. In the latter case, apart from having several cooperation projects in the area of education, language and culture, Brazil hosted the II Business Forum of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries and the Brazil-Africa Forum on politics, cooperation (both in Fortaleza in 2003) as well as the first Meeting of Parliamentarian Women of the Portuguese Speaking Countries (Brasilia in 2003) (MRE, 2007: 92). Now, during his first mandate, Lula started an initiative to create a multilateral framework that would unite countries of the African continent and South America. The first outcome was the first Africa-South America Summit (ASA I) held in Abuja/Nigeria in 2006, which gave birth to the Africa-South America Cooperative Forum (ASACOF), coordinated by Brazil and Nigeria for their respective regions, also integrating representatives of the African Union and well as from the Union of South American Nations UNASUL (MRE, 2008). Brazil played an active role in the preparations of the second Africa-South America Summit (ASA II) held in Venezuela in November 2008, for instance by hosting the first Senior Officials Meeting (SOM I) of the Africa-South America Summit in Brasilia in June 2008 (MRE, 2008). At the recently held ASA II on the Venezuelan Island of Isla Margarita in September 2009, Lula played an important role in finally establishing the (South American) Bank of the South, participating at the constitutive conventon after the foundation of the Bank 20 moths ago. Lula called for strengthening the links with Africa and tightening financial South-South Cooperation, what could be realized through
expanding the Bank of the South to the African continent, as proposed by Hugo Chávez (Silva, 2009).

4. Conclusions

Our starting point was that by contrasting the two theoretical approaches of Dependency Theory and Neoclassical Realism, we would be able to understand to what degree Brazil’s South-South Cooperation can be classified as horizontal cooperation that aims at mutual benefits or is primarily motivated by unilateral power calculations. We have found out that:

From a theoretical point of view the combination of Dependency Theory and the approach of Neoclassical Realism has shown to be fruitful in the sense that they shed light on the different worldviews established within the Brazilian foreign policy community. In this sense we can see that the North-South divide as well as South-South Solidarity in the sense of Dependency Theory are in fact still important categories for the autonomistas within the Itamaraty as well as for social movements and NGOs, which gained new strength in foreign policy during the Lula-Administration.

But still most authors (Lima, 2005; Saraiva, 2008) do not see the new vogue of South-South Cooperation as a continuation of the third wordlist approach of the 1960s, because since 1993 we are witnessing a new phase of South-South Cooperation, which is taking place after the end of the ISI era, combined with the introduction of a liberal economic domestic system, world market integration and continuous cooperation with the industrialized nations. In this sense there are more similarities with the approach of “responsible pragmatism” of the Geisel Administration in the 1970s. In this context, the distinction between a traditional and a new type of South-South Cooperation since 1993 is significant. While traditional South-South Cooperation focuses on bi- and multilateral cooperation with the countries of the region, the new South-South Cooperation expands to other developing nations outside the continent, which can be grouped by (a) system affecting states such as India, China, South Africa, etc. whose main aim is to gain influence at the international level, and (b) extra-regional developing nations, mainly in Africa, such as Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, etc., concentrating on political cooperation, trade and delivery of technical expertise.

Bearing in mind specific actors within the domestic arena such as the liberal wing within the Itamaraty as well as the internationalizing public and private companies among others, it cannot be ignored that Brazil’s behavior on a regional as well as on a global level is also determined by unilateral economic and power interests – as foreign policy in a realist point of view usually is. But
in the case of Brazil, this search for power has been pursued through cooperative hegemony (Burges, 2008; Lima, 2005; Saraiva, 2007: 50), since it is in the country’s interest to form strong alliances within the global South in order to increase its bargaining power when negotiating with the countries of the North. Also, direct gains such as market expansion within the global South are much more probable through cooperation (Pedersen, 2002). Considering the expansion of its technical cooperation, the main aim seems to be not only to strengthen the bonds with other developing countries and to let them benefit from Brazilian know-how, but also to establish its profile as an “emerging donor” and in this sense also as a “rising power” (Schirm, 2007), which still belongs to the South but is able to articulate its own interests and those of its allies at the international level (Lechini, 2008; Schläger, 2007).
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